Talk:Reality

For older talk, see Talk:Reality/Archive 1

OK, Fred, we've gotten off on the wrong foot, and I think that's mainly my fault.

Here's what I propose: I'm going to explain, again, much more nicely, the objections I have with your article. Then perhaps we can have a discussion about particular points of disagreement, and arrive at a consensus about what to do with the page.

I really would like to put an end to the unpleasant back-and-forth and actually work on this. I hope you will take my criticisms seriously, and I'll try to understand your replies seriously. --Larry Sanger

• I'll get to work on this soon, actually most of this is not my work, but certainly a portion is, expecially the onion (layered definitions). Fredbauder 12:59 Oct 20, 2002 (UTC)

In The Social Construction of Reality by Berger and Luckmann they start off the first chapter with the title, "The Reality of Everyday Life". Perhaps the onion peeling needs to start with that, perhaps "Everyday Reality", then in subsequent headings move on to alternate realities, reality based on phenomena, and only at the very last get into questions of anything that lies behind or beyond phenomena. Also I think from looking at dictionaries that noumena, although starting with Kant seems to have passed into language without necessarily implying the particular uses Kant made of the term, although it might be good to use the phrase "thing in itself" as at least a shorthand definition. I think those changes might make the article a bit more intelligible. Fredbauder 01:07 Oct 21, 2002 (UTC)

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The flush left bits are from the original (edited) article. Reality is:

You begin with a list, as if there are several agreed-upon meanings. I think this is mistaken on two counts: first, we need to give some sort of general characterization or discussion of the meaning of "reality" in general. And second, the actual senses supplied are by no means regarded by everyone as legitimate senses of "reality."

1. All that has been; is; or can be. The ultimate nature of things. All Noumena.

Few philosophers (or others, for that matter) would regard "all that can be" as part of reality. Reality is typically distinguished from what is merely possible, though some philosophers, who believe in the existence of "possibilia" (possible stuff), would want to describe possibilia as "real in some sense" ("subsistent"), even if they aren't existent.

It seems self evident that some things are possible, some are not. I know the assertion is frequently made, "Anything is possible", but that seems to be a false statement on its face. Anyway the intent is to include withing the tent of reality all that can happen and exclude all that cannot (without knowing to a certainty). What is existent is not things but the nature of things Fredbauder

Here you are again engaging in philosophy without wanting to admit it. While few will deny that some things are possible and some are not, it doesn't obviously follow from that the concept of reality encompasses that of possibility. If you think it does follow, that's another philosophical contention of yours. Since this article should not be in the business of presenting your views, but instead the leading theorizing about the subject, I don't see how your particular opinions on the question are relevant. David Lewis' (a famous metaphysician) views--such as that possible worlds exist--would be relevant. But not even David Lewis would want to assert in an encyclopedia article that reality means what is possible; he knows that's an extremely tendentious claim.

The latter paragraph, by the way, is the sort of explanation that is needed in the article itself in order to make three little words, "or can be," acceptably contextualized.

"The ultimate nature of things" is vague; philosophers, particularly idealist philosophers, have talked about "the ultimate," and philosophers more generally have certainly attempted to say what things really exist and what things exist only derivatively on what really exists. If that's what you mean, then again, needs to be explained in much more detail.

"Ulimate nature of things" seems to be equivalent to "ultimate reality". Both are by nature vague, falling essentially into the unknown, perhaps in to the unknowable. I think further expansion of a phrase which is only there as a redundancy is inappropriate. Fredbauder

The point is that you can't (it's physically impossible to) say what you want to say briefly. The philosophical view that you are trying to express simply cannot be stated briefly. So either you should omit it, or expand it greatly. I doubt you can do anywhere near an adequate job of the latter; therefore I recommend the former.

"All Noumena" is highly misleading and inappropriate right here, whether you're trying to give a general account of "reality" or even if you're trying to give another word for "ultimate reality." "Noumena" is a technical term of Kant's, and is not largely in general use except in talking about Kant or Kantianism. If what you mean is something like "objective reality" or "ultimate reality," the phrases you're looking for are "objective reality" or "ultimate reality," definitely not "noumena."

Yes, trying to give another word for ultimate reality. Kant's use of the word is indeed particular. I think that article, noumenon might use some attention. Fredbauder

It sure did need that attention before I got ahold of it. Probably still does.

2. All phenomena which may directly or indirectly observed. See science knowledge and phenomenon

This will have to be completely changed or scrapped, I think. First, "phenomena" used so soon after "noumena" implies that you are speaking in Kant's sense, which is quite different from the ordinary sense. Second, the ordinary sense of "phenomenon" is often used with a deliberate ambiguity: you want to point out that an observation someone has made is legitimate as an observation, but the thing allegedly observed might not actually exist. (Think "psychic phenomena.") So the word is confusing in this context.

Phenomena has surely escaped from Kant's use which was not as unique as his use of noumena. Yes, phenomenena can have a scepical connotation, but what is a useful word that could serve in its place, besides I have used in extensively in other articles such as phenomenon, optical phenomenon, etc. Fredbauder

My point (you really have a hard time reading texts closely, don't you?) is that if you use "phenomena" right after "noumena," it sounds like you probably mean "phenomena" in Kant's sense, as if Wikipedia were officially Kantian. As for another word, as I explained elsewhere, I don't think you should even be trying to make this point in this way. You allege to be giving one of the meanings of "reality," when that claim--that it is one of the meanings--is itself biased, because it presupposes a philosophical theory (depending on what exactly you do mean).

Third, mentioning "phenomena which may be directly or indirectly observed" as a sense of "reality" is highly tendentious. Some philosophers would be perfectly comfortable calling such things "real": Berkeley, for example. Other philosophers, and most scientists and other hard-headed realists, would take great exception with the suggestion that our experience, rather than the real stuff out in the world that our experience is of, is in any sense real. Well, experience is real in the same way that anything else that exists is real; but one way of reading your text is that "reality" can mean "our experience of reality" (or--summed up and systematized, perhaps--"knowledge" or "science" as you say), and there are many people who would disagree that reality can mean that.

The sort of reality that relies on observation of phenomena is merely scientific reality or indeed everyday reality, not the sort of ultimate reality which such a philosopher might insist on. Scientific reality is just that, the best efforts of science, not ultimate reality and makes no such pretense.Fredbauder

"The sort of ultimate reality which such a philosopher might insist on"? Huh? Philosophers are all over the map as to what the topic of "reality" addresses. Very many of them are extremely skeptical of the notion of an "ultimate reality." -- More importantly, you're still missing the point. Just re-read what I wrote, Fred, please, more carefully this time.

So the article right now simply declares that this is one of the senses of "reality" without acknowledging that in fact the sense in question is a theory about what reality really is.

It is not even that, definitely not a theory about what reality really is, that is the provence of metaphysics. Fredbauder

Um, Fred, look, I'm a philosopher. I'm telling you, it's a philosophical theory. It even has a name (or several possible names). I don't care whether you disagree. If you assert what you asserted, rather than naming it and attributing it to the theorists who have held it, you are making a biased claim.

Could you agree with the statement that scientific knowledge arises from or is verified by observation of phenomena? Fredbauder 15:55 Oct 20, 2002 (UTC)

Well, yeah. But that has nothing to do with what we're talking about.

3. The nature of things as established by authority or social norms. The world view internalized from one's parents and peers. One's reality includes one's culture, social status and sense of what is right and wrong[?].

The comment I just made applies here, but even more so. If you make a list of senses of a word, the reader expects to see different generally accepted ways in which the word is used in ordinary language (or in some technical field). However, part of the first, and apparently the whole of the second and third senses that you provide here are not generally accepted ways in which the word "reality" is used. Your list is better characterized as, perhaps, a list of theories about the meaning of reality.

Now, if that's what you're wanting to give the reader, it would be better, I think, to supply them a list of the sort that someone better informed than you or I about this topic. Based on my studies in metaphysics I think this would include common sense realism, scientific realism, phenomenalism, Berkeleyan idealism and other kinds of idealism, various (other) kinds of anti-realism and irealism, and surely a few others. One theory, which has a few (but not terribly many) adherents among analytical philosophers, has it that reality is, as your third sense says, a "social construction" in some sense. But exactly what it means to say that reality is socially constructed is no doubt one of the most serious problems this theory faces. It is just one theory, however, among very many, as I hope we can agree.

To be clear, these are theories not precisely about what "reality" means, but instead what the relationship is between, on the one hand, individual minds, Mind in the abstract, scientific theorizing, language, perception, etc.; and on the other hand, "reality," to the extent to which reality is distinct from, or independent of, items on the first list.

Reality in sense No. 3 is socially constructed[?].

So, again, you should make it abundantly clear that you are not simply elaborating a sense of the word "reality," but rather one very much disputed, and disputable, theory about reality.

It would also be a good idea, if you're going to spend much time on the theory, citing some examples of people who have held the theory.

An individual does not sui generis internalize the external world from experience and analysis but in large part absorbs from others the social constructs which make up a culture. One's sense of what is "real" may at times differ from what acually is which is sure to make life interesting.

Again, it's crucial that we make it absolutely clear that this is a theory about reality, not anything that is generally accepted about the subject.

I'm also a little confused about your presentation of the theory (it's called "social constructionism," though your text could be applied to theories that go under other names, too). You speak of "one's sense of what is 'real'," and you say that it "may at times differ from what actually is"; in that case, your present subject is clearly "a person's sense of what is real," not reality per se. If that's what you take social constructionism to be about, then you should think that it is not really appropriate to include it on this page, because it's not about reality. I would disagree with you, though; I think that social constructionists actually think they have a theory about what is real, saying that what is real depends upon perceptions, ideology, etc., and that there is no reality independent of such things.

In summary, a better discussion of the theory would (1) not assume that it is correct (i.e., evince an understanding of what parts of the theory are actually contentious), (2) attribute it, and more finely-grained presentations of it, to particular theoreticians, and (3) include some discussion of the issue of whether it's a theory about reality or about what passes as knowledge of reality--or, both!

--Larry Sanger (done for now, Oct. 19 at 4:37 PM Eastern)

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New York Times articles aren't good external links except maybe on the current events page--they're moved to a pay-only archive after a couple of weeks. Vicki Rosenzweig

True, perhaps I should be more careful. This one particularly is of marginal utility. I'd hate to see someone spend a week's income just to read it. Fredbauder 15:23 Oct 22, 2002 (UTC)

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I'm trying to understand what's going on here, Fred.

You claim to have the layman's perspective on this stuff, and that this perspective is just as valid as the philosophical. The problem is that there is no "layman's perspective" and "philosophical perspective," per se. Laymen have a variety of perspectives on the topic, if they have any perspective at all. Now, it's true that most ordinary people believe in what is called common sense realism, or perhaps "naive realism"; but that's not the perspective you were representing. The perspective you present is actually a relatively sophisticated view called social constructionism.

But let's make sure we get right down to the basic point underlying this confusion between us, Fred: you are making edits, and responding to my criticisms (above), as if you thought you really did understand the philosophical concepts and theories behind this topic very well. In fact, however, what you're saying, and the way you're replying, makes it more and more clear that you really do completely lack any significant philosophical training on the topic, as you said recently on Wikipedia-L.

So on the one hand, it seems you want to say your perspective is the layman's perspective, and that this needs representation, and that my article doesn't represent that perspective; on the other hand, you want to edit this article and work on it in a way that absolutely requires some amount of philosophical understanding of the topic, which you lack. In other words, I think you lack the basic philosophical training to recognize that the perspective you are representing here is indeed a philosophical perspective (social constructionism), one that you are not really able to properly present and defend. But because you, for some reason I can't understand, think that your perspective is a layman's perspective, you think that makes you qualified to write about it (since you're a layman).

It's now abundantly clear to me that we aren't going to be able to work together on this article until we've settled these issues.

--Larry Sanger

Well, never heard of social contructionism, but I think one point to be made is that, however labeled, I am not trying to present any specific metaphysical theory other than to define what it might concern, the ultimate nature of reality. I simply think a whole lot more than sophisticated metaphysical theories belongs in the article. It is, after all, not the article metaphysics , epistemology or philosophy of science. I doubt I would either read or try to edit any of those. For what it's worth, I'm having a lot of fun reading philosophy trying to make sense of your objections, but I have no particular claim to understanding all the details....

I'm also concerned that between us we have scared everyone else off Fredbauder 21:12 Oct 24, 2002 (UTC)

Fred, I still think you don't understand my point. Can you please respond to it? You say "I am not trying to present any specific metaphysical theory," but I'm telling you, as a metaphysician, that you are. Whether you know it or admit it or not! So, you can claim to be talking about "the ultimate nature of reality," and that's great, that's what the article's about, but fer chrissakes, get it into your head that your views about the ultimate nature of reality are philosophical views! There aren't any other kind! There's no way to "step outside" the process of philosophical theorizing about reality, and just talking about reality, period. --Larry Sanger

I understand your position very well. If a topic in whole or part arguably falls within the provenance of philosophy only philosophical aspects of the topic are to be allowed. Examples include reality, knowledge, phenomenon. I disagree with this position and maintain that if the subject matter of a topic exists factual material regarding it may be properly included in the article about it. Let us consider divorce, arguably within the provenance of law. The legal aspects of law are relatively simple (although one can add reams of detail), but most interesting and useful information about divorce is not legaly oriented, in fact, some of the most useful information is how to avoid litigation (over those "interesting" details). Fredbauder 14:52 Oct 25, 2002 (UTC)

It is not my position that, as you say, "If a topic in whole or part arguably falls within the provenance of philosophy only philosophical aspects of the topic are to be allowed." You claim, when you present your "onion theory" and make the claim that philosophy is a social construct, not to be presupposing any philosophical views. But that claim is simply mistaken. Yes, you are presupposing philosophical views (about what "reality" can mean, or what reality is), and to the extent that you are, those views need to be spelled out clearly and explicitly. If they aren't, your article is in error and biased. But unfortunately, you seem to lack the ability to do that; what you write, as I've explained above and as your responses further demonstrate, is full of basic philosophical mistakes and philosophical presuppositions. The result is that your text is full of errors and bias, but you won't admit it. You apparently think you should be immune from criticism, precisely because I'm more of an expert on this stuff, and you think you're more competent at presenting the layman's point of view. Obviously, I disagree.

If there were a sociologist here, who wanted to work on a section of the article that presented social constructionism, I'd be glad to make sure that the work did not beg any important philosophical questions and thus was not NPOV. But much of that theory is foreign to me, and I'd be the student, not the expert.

If there were a psychologist here, who wanted to explain how psychologists treat the concept of reality in descriptions of schizophrenia, and the controversy that ensues, I'd be greatly interested. Again, this is a topic I know only a little about, and my interest would be mainly in making sure that no important philosophical questions were being begged.

Now let's also get clear about another thing: the mere fact that a theory, which uses the concept of reality in some non-philosophical domain, does make some philosophical presuppositions certainly does not mean that it must be presented from a philosophical point of view, nor does it mean that we cannot present it. But what we must do, in a multidisciplinary context, is to make sure that we have spelled out the philosophical presuppositions clearly, and not simply to assert that the theory is correct (as you have tried to do repeatedly, contrary to the NPOV policy).

See above for a few more replies.

--Larry Sanger

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I think, in case it might be helpful, that Fred's contributions have struck me as being too much like the beginnings of a how-to manual on how to think about [Reality]. Under the most comprehensive of all possible topics (assuming that [Unreality] is addressed simultaneously), I appreciate that it's pretty tough to be neutral. But, the approach that Larry keeps insisting on sure makes a lot of sense to me. I'm not sure I would direct my children to an entry on [Reality], that sets before them as a universally agreed upon starting point that, Reality is like an onion. Mkmcconn

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I'm now in the process of greatly expanding this article. I will try to include--written from a neutral point of view--as much of the points raised in the old article as I can.

I will not be including many, if any, of the items from the old bibliography or external links, which I thought were, with a few exceptions, simply very poor representations of the literature on this subject.

The old article can be found here: Talk:Reality/Old article.

--Larry Sanger

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OK, I'm done rewriting the article. Comments about why I removed the links: "3 views of reality" and "Quantum Reality" were both links to hack sites, as far as I can tell; Wikipedia should link only to credible sources. The Russell chapter would be welcome if it were accompanied by a whole list of sources. But if it's the only thing left after I've gutted the list, let's get rid of it too. The Marxism page is a biased and extremely lightweight presentation of Marxist materialism; it's really just a silly political screed, and not even academically credible as a presentation of Marxist materialism. I have no information about the creator of "The Radical Academy" which put up the Berkeley page; it doesn't look very good to me--there are many better sources about Berkeley online. The cognitive studies program at Tufts has nothing to do with the topic of reality precisely speaking! Ditto the New York Times article.

None of the books listed in the bibliography are books that I would put in a "required reading" list of books on the topic of reality, except maybe the Searle book. They might be perfectly suitable for articles about parallel universes, contemporary conservatism, and other topics.

One last note for now: by no means do I think the reality article is now complete. I can easily see adding sections about physicists' bizarre cogitations about the nature of reality, as long as we can justify putting that stuff under this heading. Maybe it would be better to put it under the heading universe...reality might be coextensive with the universe, but that doesn't mean they're the same topic. --Larry Sanger

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Fred, If you compare the two opening paragraphs, can you see how much of a problem there will be for other editors to contribute anything that is compatible with your view, unless they adopt your view?

Reality is that portion of ultimate reality which is accessible to scientific and philosophical observation, investigation and theoretical interpretation.

Reality is everything that actually exists, or at least everything that is real.

The essay avoids the esoteric distinction you make, and engages the topic as the large and difficult issue that it is, fraught as it is with paradox and incompleteness. You attempt to narrow the scope of the topic, by "disambiguation": dividing treatment into "what is real" and "what is ultimately real" - the field of what is knowable as a subset of the field that includes what is beyond knowledge. This approach is unique to you, in my opinion; which makes your approach confusing, when it appears in combination with the essay's more neutral approach. As a result, the first paragraph of this article weakens the article very much. I don't want to repeat the edit war, though. If you can't agree with me, I'll walk away with no hard feelings. Mkmcconn 14:16 Apr 20, 2003 (UTC)

Wikipedia attempts to be a compendium of human knowledge. That which is "beyond knowledge" is, by definition, also outside the scope of Wikipedia. Mkmcconn, in other words, is right. Tannin

It is well known and a part of the canon of human knowledge that reality presents to us unanswerable (by reason if not by faith or revelation) questions. Fred Bauder 15:46 Apr 20, 2003 (UTC)

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• Reality
  • Daniel C. Boyer June 6, 2002, becuase : Subject is approached from a realist bias and even reality-enforcing viewpoint. Rewrite from a more NPOV, especially as regards psychosis.

from wikipedia:votes for NPOV - I assume this is dealt with?

I believe the material he objected to was deleted by Larrry Sanger when he re-wrote the article. Fred Bauder 13:10 May 12, 2003 (UTC)

• There is nothing socially constructed about what we consider a scientific topic, and what is not scientific.
  • Heh, just recall Galileo being brought up for charges. Fred Bauder 17:49 17 Jun 2003 (UTC)
• one cannot use science to measure love.
  • One can easily observe dialation of the pupil of the lover's eye. Fred Bauder 17:49 17 Jun 2003 (UTC)
• People who claim that experimentally testable aspects of reality are merely social constructs...
  • No such claim was made in the deleted material. Fred Bauder 17:49 17 Jun 2003 (UTC)

As to the rest which seems to consist mainly of name-calling, may I suggest you consider whether or not you are all that superior. Fred Bauder 17:49 17 Jun 2003 (UTC)

Fred, no one is calling you names...I was referring to radical deconstructionists. Unless you fall into their camp, those specific remarks do not refer to you. As for your odd claim that science can measure love...love has nothing to do with how big someone's pupil is. (Science can measure hormonal and physiological effects, but that's all.) If you really insist that a scientific measurement exists for love, then you are outside the bounds of both romantics and scientists, and you have put yourself into a new group that consists of no one but yourself! RK 18:35 17 Jun 2003 (UTC)

In any case, you missed the main point. What you meant to write is something very different from what you have actually written. I not preventing you from writing on this topic; I am just removing this one sentence; all I am asking is that you rephrase this sentence to make it clear and accurate. This is no big deal. RK 18:35 17 Jun 2003 (UTC)

What you have done is lame but not totally unacceptable. Fred Bauder 01:41 18 Jun 2003 (UTC)

Seriously, I don't mind if you rewrite my own contribution! Now that I see what you mean, I just think that your original sentence was vague. Please, by all means rewrite it if you would like. I am removing my original criticism. RK 02:08 18 Jun 2003 (UTC)

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"Reality is that portion of ultimate reality which is accessible to scientific and philosophical observation, investigation and theoretical interpretation. Some portion of ultimate reality may lie beyond our scope to examine or even imagine": if this statement is not typical of and proof of the validity of reality enforcement as a topic, I don't know what is. --Daniel C. Boyer

It is not but Socially constructed reality is. The quoted statement refers to portions of reality which are inaccessable no matter what social or cultural position is taken. Fred Bauder 02:34 2 Jul 2003 (UTC)

What I am criticising is defining reality as only a portion of ultimate reality. Clearly (at least in theory) there may be some portions of ultimate reality which are not accessible to scientific or philosophical observation, investigation or theoretical interpretation. Saying otherwise is limiting the understanding of reality. --Daniel C. Boyer

Well, a masterfully ambiguous statement, perhaps you should take a stab at editing the article so we can see what change you would make. Fred Bauder 19:31 2 Jul 2003 (UTC)