There's a good website on Condorcet's method. I forget the link.
One important point is to mention Arrow's Theorem. There is a weaker verison of Arrow's conditions that the Condorcet method does satisfy.
- Probably referring to http://electionmethods.org . There's a redefinition of Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives Criteria whereby "Irrelevant" is redefined. Basically, under the weaker version, candidates locked in a circular tie aren't considered "irrelevant". Condorcet can meet that criteria because it's only the tie-breaker that gets you in trouble, not the core method.
- This weaker criterion is called Local Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
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