French States-General

In France the States-General (in French:Etats-Généraux) or Estates-General as an assembly of the different classes of French citizenry, owed their origin to the same causes which produced the Parliament of England, the Cortes of Spain, the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire and the Diets (in German: Landtage) of the states of Germany, and they resembled these assemblies in their constitution. In these countries the royal or ducal power, when it began to extend its scope, found itself limited by the feudal system and had to turn to the forces of feudalism to obtain from them aid and counsel, i.e. pecuniary assistance and moral support. Instead of treating severally with the local representatives of these forces the ruler found it useful and convenient to enter into contact with them as a whole, treating with them through their principal representatives.

In France these conditions led in 1302 to a general assembly consisting of the chief lords, both lay and ecclesiastical, and the representatives of the principal privileged towns, which were like distinct lordships. There had, of course, been certain precedents before 1302 which had, as it were, paved the way for this institution; the representatives of the principal towns had several times been convoked by the king, and under Philip III there had been assemblies of nobles and ecclesiastics in which the two orders had deliberated separately. It was the dispute between Philip the Fair and Pope Boniface VIII which led to the States-General of 1302; the king of France desired that, in addition to the officers of the Crown, the principal authorities of the country sbould come and testify solemnly that they were at one with the king in this serious crisis. The letters summoning the assembly of 1302 are published by M. Georges Picot in his collection of Documents inédits pour servir a l’histoire de France. In 1302 the States-General had been called upon only to give counsel to the king; but during the same reign they were several times assembled to give him aid, i.e. to grant him subsidies, and in course of time this came to be the most frequent motive of their convocation.

In one sense the composition and powers of the States-General always remained the same. They always included representatives of the clergy, nobility and third estate, and monarchs always summoned them either to grant subsidies or to advise the Crown, to give aid and counsel. Their composition, however, as well as their effective powers, varied greatly at different times.

In their primitive form in the 14th and the first half of the 15th centuries, the States-General had only a limited elective element. The lay lords who appeared therein were not elected, but directly chosen and summoned by the king, and the same was the case with the prelates, bishops and clergy, who were summoned qua ecclesiastical lords. In the order of the clergy, however, since certain ecclesiastical bodies, e.g. abbeys and chapters[?] of cathedrals, were also. summoned to the assembly, and as these bodies, being persons in the moral but not in the physical sense, could not appear in person, their representative had to be chosen by the monks of the convent or the canons of the chapter. It was only the representation of the third estate which was furnished by election. Originally, moreover, the latter was not called upon as a whole to seek representation in the estates. It was only the bonnes villes, the privileged towns, which were called upon. They were represented by elected procureurs, who were frequently the municipal officials of the town, but deputies were often elected for the purpose. The country districts, the plat pays, were not represented.

It was during the last thirty years of the 16th century that the States-General became an entirely elective body and really representative of the whole nation as divided into three parts. This came about through various causes. On the one hand, the nobles and prelates who were summoned were not always inclined to attend the estates, so had themselves represented by an envoy, a procureur, as they had the right to do, and frequently the lords or prelates of the same district chose the same procureur to represent them. On the other hand, the Crown seems at that time to have felt the need of having the consent of representatives really expressing the will and feelings of all the orders, and especially of the third estate as a whole. The letters of summons to the States-General of 1484 invited the ecclesiastics, nobles and third estate in general, to meet at the chief town of their bailliage or sindchaussie and elect deputies. An intermediate form had been employed in 1468 when the prelates and lords had still been summoned personally, but the towns had each elected three deputies, an ecclesiastic, a noble and a burgess[?].

At the estates of 1484 there seems to have been universal and direct suffrage for all the three orders. But the roturiers of the country districts could not in practice avail themselves of this power; so the country communities and small towns spontaneously elected delegates to represent them at the electoral assembly. Thus a system of indirect election arose for the third estate which became confirmed and subsequently continued to be used. To a certain extent there were sometimes more than two degrees in the suffrage; the delegates nominated by the country communities would gather together with the electors chosen by the neighbouring little town, and appoint with them new delegates to represent them at the electoral assembly of the bailliage. This ultimately became the system. For the clergy and nobles the suffrage remained direct; but as a rule only such ecclesiastics were admitted to the assembly of the bailliage as possessed a benefice[?], and only such lords as had a fief.

The effective powers of the States-General likewise varied over time. In the 14th century they were actually great. The king could not, in theory, levy general taxation. Even in the provinces attached to the domain of the Crown, he could only levy it where he had retained the haute justice over the inhabitants, but not on the subjects of lords having the haute justice. The privileged towns had generally the right of taxing themselves. In order to obtain general taxes, the king had to obtain the consent of the lay and ecclesiastical lords and of the towns; this amounted to obtaining the authorisation of the States-General, which only granted these subsidies temporarily for a fairly short period. The result was that they were summoned fairly frequently and that their power over the Crown might become considerable.

But in the second half of the 14th century certain royal taxes, levied throughout the whole of the domain of the Crown, tended to become permanent and independent of the vote of the estates. This sprang from many causes, but from one in particular; the Crown endeavoured by transforming and changing the nature of the "feudal aid" to levy a general tax by right, on its own authority, in such cases as those in which a lord could demand feudal aid from his vassals[?]. For instance, it was in this way that the necessary taxes were raised for twenty years to pay the ransom of King John II of France without a vote of the States-General, although they met several times during this period. Custom confined this tendency. Thus during the second half of the 15th century the chief taxes, the taille, aids and gabelle became definitely permanent for the benefit of the Crown, sometimes by the formal consent of the States-General, as in 1437 in the case of the aids.

The critical periods of the Hundred Years' War favoured to the States-General, though at the price of great sacrifices. Under the reign of King John II they had had for a few years, from 1355 to 1358, not only the voting, but through their commissaries, the administration of and jurisdiction over the taxes. In the first half of the reign of Charles VII they had been summoned almost every year and had patriotically voted subsidies. And when the struggle was over they renounced, through weariness and a longing for peace, their most precious right, the power of the purse.

At the estates of 1484, however, after the death of Louis IX, there occurred a kind of awakening. The deputies of the three orders united their efforts in perfect harmony in the hope of regaining the right of periodically sanctioning taxation. They voted the taille for two years only, at the same time reducing it to the amount which it had reached at the end of the reign of Charles VII. They even demanded, and obtained, the promise of the Crown that they should be summoned again before the expiry of the two years. But the promise was not kept, and we do not find the States-General summoned again till 1560. There was then a first interruption of 76 years in the working of the institution, while the absolute monarchy was establishing itself. But there was a revival of its activity in the second half of the 16th century caused by the scarcity of money and the quarrels and wars of religion. The estates of Orleans in 1560, followed by those of Pontoise[?] in 1561, and those of Blois in 1576 and 1588 were most remarkable for the wisdom, courage and efforts of the deputies, but on the whole were lacking in effect. Those of 1588 ended with a regular coup d'etat effected by Henry III, and the States summoned by the League, which sat in Paris in 1593 and whose chief object was to elect a Catholic king, were not a success. The States-General again met in Paris in 1614, on the occasion of the disturbances which followed the death of Henry IV; but though their minutes hear witness to their sentiments of exalted patriotism, the dissensions between the three orders rendered them weak and they were dissolved before having completed their work, not to be summoned again till 1789.

As to the question whether the States-General formed one or three chambers[?] for the purposes of their working, from the constitutional point of view the point was never decided. What the king required was to have the consent, the resolution of the three estates of the realm[?]; it was in reality of little importance to him whether their resolutions expressed themselves in common or separately. At the States-General of 1484 the elections were made in common for the three orders, and the deputies also arrived at their resolutions in common. But after 1560 the rule was that each order should deliberate separately; the royal declaration of 23 June 1789 even stated that they formed three distinct chambers. But Necker's report to the conseil du roi according to which the convocation of 1789 was decided, said (as did the declaration of 23 June 1789), that on matters of common interest the deputies of the three orders could deliberate together, if each of the others decided by a separate vote in favour of this, and if the king consented.

The working of the States-General led to an almost exclusive system of deliberation by committees. There were, it is true, solemn general sessions, called seances royales, because the king presided; but at these there was no discussion. At the first, the king or his chancellor announced the object of the convocation, and set forth the demands or questions put to them by the Crown; at the other royal sessions each order made known its answers or observations by the mouth of an orateur elected for the purpose. But almost all useful work was done in the sections, among which the deputies of each order were divided. At the estates of 1484 they were divided into six nations or sections, corresponding to the six généralités then existing. Subsequently the deputies belonging to the same gouvernement formed a group or bureau for deliberating and voting purposes. Certain questions, however, were discussed and decided in full assembly; sometimes, too, the estates nominated commissaries in equal numbers for each order. But in the ancient States-General there was never any personal vote. The unit represented for each of the three orders was the bailliage or sénéchaussé and each bailliage had one vote, the majority of the deputies of the bailliage deciding in what way this vote should be given.

At the estates of the 16th century voting was by gouvernements, each gouvernement having one vote, but the majority of the bailliages composing the gouvernement decided how it should be given.

The States-General, when they gave counsel, had in theory only a consultative faculty. They had the power of granting subsidies, which was the chief and ordinary cause of their convocation. But it had come to be a consent with which the king could dispense. We have seen how permanent taxation became established. In the 16th century, however, the estates again claimed that their consent was necessary for the establishment of new taxation, and, on the whole, the facts seemed to be in favour of this view at the time. But in the course of the 17th century the principle gained recognition that the king could tax on his own sole authority. Thus were established in the second half of the 17th century, and in the 18th, the direct taxes of the capitation and of the dixième or vingtième, and many indirect taxes. It was sufficient for the law creating them to be registered by the cours des aides and the parlements. It was only in 1787 that the parlement of Paris declared that it could not register the new taxes, the land-tax and stamp duty (subvention territoriale and impôt du timbre), as they did not know whether they would be submitted to by the country, and that the consent of the representatives of the tax-payers must be asked.

The States-General had legally no share in the legislative power, which belonged to the king alone. The States of Blois demanded, it is true, in 1576, that the king should be bound to turn into law any proposition voted in identical terms by each of the three orders; but Henry III would not grant this demand, which would not even have left him a right of veto. In practice; however, the States-General contributed largely to legislation. Those who sat in them had at all times the right of presenting complaints (doléances), requests and petitions to the king; in this, indeed, consisted their sole initiative. They were usually answered by an ordonnance, and it is chiefly through these that we are acquainted with the activity of the estates of the 14th and 15th centuries. In the latest form, and from the estates of 1484 onwards, this was done by a new and special procedure. The States had become an entirely elective assembly, and at the elections (at each step of the election if there were several) the electors drew up a cahier des doléances (statement of grievances) which they requested the deputies to present; this even appeared to be the most important feature of an election. The deputies of each order in every bailliage also brought with them a cahier des doléances, which was arrived at, for the third estate, by a combination of the statements drawn up by the primary or secondary electors. On the assembly of the estates the cahiers of the bailliages were incorporated into a cahier for each gouvernement, and these again into a cahier general or general statement, which was presented to the king, and which he answered in his council. When the three orders deliberated in common, as in 1484, there was only one cahier général; when they deliberated separately, there were three, one for each order. The drawing up of the cahier general was looked upon as the main business (le grand cause) of the session.

By this means the States-General furnished the material for numerous ordonnances, though the king did not always adopt the propositions contained in the cahiers, and often modified them in forming them into an ordonnance. These latter were the ordonnances de reforme (reforming ordinances), treating of the most varied subjects, according to the demands of the cahiers. They were not, however, for the most part very well observed. The last of the type was the grande ordonnance of 1629 (Code Michau) drawn up in accordance with the cahiers of 1614 and with the observations of various assemblies of notables which followed them.

The States-General had, however, peculiar power which was recognised, but was of a kind that could not often be exercised; it was what might be called a constituent power. The ancient public law of France contained a number of rules called "the fundamental laws of the realm" (lois fondamentales du royaume), though most of them were purely customary; chief among them were the rules of determining the succession to the Crown and those forbidding the alienation of the domain of the Crown. The king, supreme though his power might be, could not abrogate, modify or infringe them. But it was admitted that he might do so by the consent of the States-General. The States could give the king a dispensation from a fundamental law in a given instance; they could even, in agreement with the king, make new fundamental laws. The States of Blois of 1576 and 1588 offer entirely convincing precedents in this respect. It was universally recognised that in the event of the line of Hugh Capet becoming extinct, it would be the function of the States-General to elect a new king.

The States-General of 1614 proved the last for over a century and a half. A new convocation had indeed been announced to take place on the majority of Louis XIV, and letters were even issued in view of the elections, but this ended in nothing. Absolute monarchy progressively became definitely established, and appeared incompatible with the institution of the States-General. Liberal minds, however, in the entourage of Louis, Duke of Burgundy[?], who were preparing a new plan of government in view of his expected accession to the French throne in succession to Louis XIV, thought of reviving the institution. It figures in the projects of Saint-Simon[?] and Fénelon though the latter would have preferred to begin with an assembly of non-elected notables. But though St Simon stood high in the favour of the regent Orléans[?], the death of Louis XIV did not see a summoning of the Estates.

In 1789 the summons did come. As Fénelon had wished in former days, an assembly of notables[?] in 1787, (which already displayed great independence), preceded the States-General session. The refusal of the parlement of Paris to register the fiscal edicts submitted to the Notables led to the convocation of the States-General. The Notables, who had sat in 1787, were again summoned in 1788 to inquire into and fix the rules for the elections and the procedure of the States. Necker, in the Mémoire which he submitted to the conseil du roi in December 1788, granted for these States the doublement du tiers, i.e. that the third estate should have a number of deputies equal to that of the deputies of the other two orders combined, this is what had happened previously in the few provincial assemblies created by Necker during his first administration and in those created by an edict of 1787 for all the pays d’élections. But Necker’s report, as to the subject of deliberating separately (par ordre) or in common, simply referred to the ancient principles; and he seems also to have proposed to maintain the system of voting by bailliages. Now the doubling of the tiers could yield it no real advantage unless the deliberation was in common and the voting by individuals, and it was this question which from 6 May 1789 onwards was the subject of the separate deliberations and negotiations between the three orders.

On 13 June 1789 the third estate had arrived at a resolution to examine and settle in common the powers of the three orders, and invited to this common work those of the clergy and nobles. Certain of the latter and the majority of the clergy joined the tiers, and on 17 June 1789 it arrived at the celebrated decision by which it affirmed the principle of the national supremacy residing in the mass of the nation; the deputies, without any distinction of order, constituted a national assembly, which assembly was called upon to regenerate France by giving her a constitution, while the royal power (which in reality became provisional) could not negative its decisions.

King Louis XVI tried to resist. In the séance royale of 23 June 1789, where he took the attitude of granting a charte octroyée (a constitution granted of the royal favour), he affirmed, subject to the traditional limitations, the right of separate deliberation for the three orders, which constitutionally formed three chambers. This move failed; soon that part of the deputies of the nobles who still stood apart joined the National Assembly at the request of the king. The States-General had ceased to exist, having become the National Constituent Assembly, though it consisted of the deputies elected by the order.

See G. Picot, Histoire des Etats-généraux (2nd edition, Paris, 1888).

Original text from 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica