Of course, it's very unclear that a theistic foundation is any better off than any of the myriad naturalistic foundations we habitually partake of. Moreover, it's unclear why we should take any foundation seriously if it works only by wildly stipulating entities that enjoy no independent support. Foundations seem too easy if we can simply mentally contrive a perfect foundation, no matter how outlandish, and then persuade ourselves to believe in it. I can resolve Cartesian doubts[?] about sense reliability simply by stipulating that I have an infallible perceptual setup; but that's wishful thinking and I know it. It's unclear how a theistic foundation is different. For these reasons, this argument is unpopular among most theists and most philosophers, and it remains confined to a relatively small segment of Christian thought. But, perhaps the recent and pioneering work of Alvin Plantinga on similar issues will help improve the argument, or at least lend it credence.
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