Thomas Nagel

He is known within philosophy of mind as an advocate of the idea that consciousness and subjective experience cannot be reduced to brain activity. One of his most famous articles is "What is it like to be a bat?" This article was originally published in 1974 in the journal The Philosophical Review but has since been reprinted in several books that are concerned with consciousness and the mind, such as The Mind's I by Daniel Dennett and Douglas Hofstadter. (Also reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, edited by Ned Block and the book Mortal Questions.) Nagel first argued that the subjective experience of consciousness can never be attained through the objective methods of reductionistic science. Second, Nagel concluded that because of the general problem of subjective experience, "we cannot even pose the mind-body problem" in a sensible way and "it seems unlikely that a physical theory of mind can be contemplated." While many philosophers of mind and cognitive neuroscientists accept the fundamental distinction between the subjective and the objective, they often have not accepted Nagel's dismal conclusions. For example, philosophers and biologists such as Daniel Dennett and Gerald Edelman have gone ahead and proposed theories of mind and consciousness.

External Link

• Thomas Nagel's faculty page (http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/nagel/)